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How can organizations in contractual engagements mitigate their risk and increase 
partner satisfaction when the engagement may not last long enough to forge ‘traditional’ 
bonds of trust?  We investigate perceptions of contract specificity, organizational 
similarity, contract monitoring costs, operational flexibility and fair treatment as 
antecedents to partner satisfaction.  We empirically test our hypotheses using data 
collected on 72 contractual engagements from Canadian consulting engineering firms.  
Our results indicate that firms are likely to be more satisfied when they partner with 
organizations with which they have had a previous satisfying experience.  Furthermore, 
written contracts with overly excessive specifications can have a negative effect on 
satisfaction.   
 
Organizations operating in today’s unpredictable, dynamic environments are increasingly 
looking to inter-firm partnerships as a means of acquiring the flexibility required to adapt and 
survive (Lee, Chen & Kao, 2003).  Prior research has, for the most part, focused on assessing the 
antecedents and outcomes of alliance partnerships and theoretical perspectives to describe the 
motivations behind such collaborative partnerships.  However, little attention has been paid to 
the contractual engagement form of alliance (Lambe, Spekman & Hunt, 2000), which focuses on 
narrowly defined mutual objectives with an intentionally limited or closed-ended life-span.   We 
define a contractual engagement to be “a close, collaborative, fast-developing, short-lived 
exchange relationship in which companies pool their skills and/or resources to address a 
transient, albeit important, business opportunity and/or threat” (Lambe et al., 2000: 213). 
 
Prior research acknowledges the importance of the development of trust in mitigating risk and 
increasing partner satisfaction (Lambe et al., 2000).  However, trust between alliance partners 
develops over time (Spekman, Isabella, MacAvoy & Forbes, 1996). Given that ‘longer-term’ 
alliances have the opportunity to evolve over time, our prior understanding of the evolutionary 
development of open-ended alliance relationships may not apply to contractual engagement 
forms (Lambe et al., 2000).  Therefore, what still remains unknown is how contractually engaged 
partners mitigate the risks of their relationships when the partnership does not exist long enough 
for trust to develop. 
 
Our objectives for this research are to develop and empirically test a model that examines 
specific constructs that may be important in mitigating risk within a contractual engagement.  
Specifically we ask: Given that contractual engagements may not exist long enough for trust to 
develop, how can parties to the engagement mitigate their risk and increase their satisfaction 
with the partner?  We structure the paper as follows.  First, drawing on exchange theory, 
transaction cost economics and expectancy theory, we develop a conceptual model of the 
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antecedents of partner satisfaction.  Second, we empirically test our model via a Partial Least 
Squares approach (Wold, 1985) to structural equation modeling using cross-sectional survey data 
collected from a sample of contractual engagements within 24 consulting engineering firms in 
Canada (i.e.: firm A enters into a contractual engagement with firm B to complete a project for 
firm A’s client). Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial 
implications of the findings, as well as suggestions for future research.   
 
Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Model 
 
Expectancy theory suggests that parties to a contractual engagement will be satisfied with their 
partner if their expected outcomes are met.  However, transaction cost economics informs us that 
regardless of the length of collaboration, partnering entails the willingness to accept a certain 
degree of risk, implying the need for trust between partners (Williamson, 1993).  Thus, partner 
satisfaction will occur when risk is minimized and trust is maximized in such a way that 
expectations are collaboratively met (Vroom, 1964).    Collaborating parties often employ 
governance mechanisms as a means of safeguarding themselves against potential risks such as 
outcome uncertainty (Kogut, 1988), opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1993), and 
uncooperative behavior (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  As a result, governance mechanism can 
increase trust by increasing a partner’s level of willingness to accept certain risks (Das & Teng, 
2001).  However, given the limited lifespan of a contractual engagement, common alliance 
governance mechanisms such as joint investments (Joshi & Stump, 1999), relational norms, 
standards and goal congruency (Jap, 2001), may not be suitable for contractual engagements.  
Furthermore, since trust evolves over time (Thibault & Kelley, 1959) the duration of a 
contractual engagement may restrict the ability of trust to evolve.  In such cases, other 
governance and safeguarding mechanisms must be considered in order to mitigate risk, increase 
trusting behavior and ultimately increase partner satisfaction with the engagement.  We propose 
five antecedents to contractual engagement partner satisfaction which we detail in the subsequent 
sections.  
 
Antecedents to Partner Satisfaction 
 
Contract Specificity: As contractual engagements are time constrained, the renegotiation of 
relationship terms becomes less viable (Reuer & Ariño, 2002).  Thus, based on transaction cost 
economics theory, it is likely that the written contract will be the traditional protective 
mechanism in these circumstances.  When explicit terms, expectations and potential penalties are 
detailed within the contract, parties are more likely to be motivated to comply (Macneil, 2000). 
Williamson (1993) suggests that written contracts produce calculative trust by minimize 
uncertainty through explicit agreements.  Thus, contract specificity reduces risk since penalties 
for non-compliance are clearly stated (Parke, 1993). 
 
Organizational Similarity: A significant tenet of social exchange theory is that continual 
interactions create trust and similarity (Thibault & Kelley, 1959).  While the written contract is 
an important antecedent to satisfactory collaboration, organizations that have a shared common 
work history may experience lower perceptions of risk, reduced opportunistic behavior and 
increased inter-firm trust (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).  Thus, partners that perceive they are similar 
to each other are more likely to trust one another without the need for overly explicit contracts 
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(Gulati, 1998).  While previous empirical results suggest the importance of organizational 
similarity in long-term relationships (Reve & Stern, 1979),  to date it does not appear to have 
been examined as an antecedent of partner satisfaction vis-à-vis contractual engagements 
(Lambe et al., 2000). 
 
Contract Monitoring Costs: While contracts specify the norms of behavior and outcomes, 
organizations attempt to control risk by monitoring partners to ensure that activities and 
outcomes are conducted according to the contract (Das & Teng, 2001).    However, the 
requirement to monitor the partnering firm’s activities to ensure contract compliance adds 
additional cost to the organization.  Transaction cost economics suggests that the partners within 
the collaboration, striving to operate in the most efficient manner possible, will seek to incur a 
minimal level of contract monitoring costs (Zajac & Olsen, 1993).  If outcomes and contingency 
issues are clearly defined within the contract, then parties are less likely to face situations where 
their roles or obligations are ambiguous.  Therefore, we expect that as contract specificity 
increases, contractual partners will find that monitoring becomes more efficient and requires 
lower monitoring costs.  Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The specificity of the written contract will be negatively related to contract 
monitoring costs. 
An organization that perceives a partnering firm to be similar in nature is more likely to 
trust its partner to carryout the terms of the contract.  Empirical and theoretical evidence 
provided by Zajac and Olsen (1993), suggests that parties with a history of positive previous 
collaborative experiences, will enter into future relationships that require less explicit governance 
controls and monitoring.  Therefore, as organizational similarity increases, a firm’s contract 
monitoring behavior and associated costs will decrease.  Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Organizational similarity will be negatively related to contract monitoring costs. 
 
Operational Flexibility: Organizations require a specific level of operational flexibility in order 
to carry out their day to day operations.  In collaborative engagements, a firm must carefully 
balance its individual flexibility within the context of the contractual agreement.  Operational 
flexibility decreases risk since the collaborating firm will believe its capability to conduct its 
daily operations is not at jeopardy.  Transaction cost theorists argue that excessively detailed 
contractual safeguards can create inflexible operating environments (Lui & Ngo, 2004) While we 
expect there to be a negative relationship between contract specificity and operational flexibility, 
we also suggest that organizational similarity will increase operational flexibility.  Thus:  
 
 Hypothesis 1b: The specificity of the written contract will be negatively related to operational 
flexibility. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Organizational similarity will be positively related to operational flexibility. 
 
Perceived Fair Treatment: Expectancy theory holds that partner satisfaction is dependent on the 
individual firm achieving the expectations it desires from the relationship.  However, the nature 
of the interaction between partners influences the perception of the relationship and, ultimately, 
the economic value of the collaboration (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  As such, favourable 
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perception of fairness during the life of the contract enhances partner satisfaction. Transaction 
cost economics suggests that contract specifications provide for the attainment of the stated 
outcomes, which in turn produces perceived justice and reciprocity in terms of fair treatment. 
Likewise, exchange theory indicates that organizational similarity enhances inter-organizational 
trust (Reve & Stern, 1979).  Thus previous successful interactions with partners are likely to 
increase the chance of future satisfaction. Based on the above, we expect that higher levels of 
contractual specificity and increased levels organizational similarity will lead to higher levels of 
fair treatment.  Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 1c: The specificity of the written contract will be positively related to fair treatment. 
 




The outcome of collaborations can be measured using various benchmarks such as profitability, 
competitive advantage, product effectiveness, et cetera.  In many ways, appropriate measures of 
the outcomes of alliances are intrinsically tied to the purpose and objective of the alliance.  
Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), suggests that considering the effort required to execute the 
collaborative objective, if expected outcomes are met, firms will be satisfied with their partners.  
Thus, we measure partner satisfaction as the outcome of the efforts of the collaboration. Inter-
organizational trust increases relationship satisfaction and the potential for meeting specific 
collaborative expectations (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  When a firm does not have to invest 
significant amounts of time monitoring a partner’s behavior, then it is more likely to be satisfied 
with that partner.  Correspondingly, if, during the life of the contract, the firm perceives it was 
able to maintain a sufficient degree of flexibility, it is likely to be more satisfied with the partner.  
Finally, the firm will be satisfied with its partner if it perceives that it was treated fairly during 
the contract. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Contract monitoring costs will be negatively related to partner satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Operational flexibility will be positively related to partner satisfaction. 
 





The Sample and Data Collection Method 
 
The subject for this study consisted of 24 consulting engineering firms. Within this industry, a 
significant amount of business is conducted through short-term, contract-based projects for the 
construction, transportation, and industrial sectors (Consulting Engineers of Alberta, 2002).  
Furthermore, given the required stringent professional qualifications, the consulting engineering 
industry will likely experience situations where success in certain alliance relationships will lead 
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to repeat partnering. The consulting engineering industry, therefore, is uniquely suitable for the 
investigation of contractual engagements. 
 
Preliminary exploratory interviews with industry executives indicated that most major capital 
projects requiring consulting engineering contracts were completed by firms with 10 or more 
employees.  Using this criterion, a list totalling 28 consulting engineering firms based in Alberta, 
Canada was generated from a consultant engineering association database.  These 28 firms 
represented approximately 20% of the total consulting engineering firms (with more than 10 
employees) in Canada.   Twenty-eight senior executives (one from each targeted firm) were then 
contacted to request their firm's participation in the study, which involved the permission to 
interview and survey two project executives from the firm.  Of the 28 senior executives 
contacted, 24 agreed to participate in the study.  While most firms were able to provide two 
project executives, six of the 24 could only provide one.  In total, 42 project executives 
participated in the research. 
 
The survey questionnaire data was collected during personal interviews with project executives 
lasting approximately 70 minutes each.  During the interview, the participant was asked to 
identify and discuss, one recent collaboration experience where expectations of the project were 
met, and one where expectations were not met.  In 12 instances, only one recent engagement 
could be recalled.  Following the discussion, the project executive then completed the survey 
instrument.  From the 42 executives participating, data was collected regarding 72 recent 
contractual engagements.  Of those 72 engagements, expectations were stated to have been met 
in 37 (51%) of the cases.  The alliances reported in the surveys ranged from six months to three 
years in length, with the average engagement lasting approximately 18 months in duration. 
 
The Measurement Instrument 
 
Measurement items for the six constructs were developed by adapting existing scales to suit our 
research context, and by creating new scales items where existing items did not adequately suit our 
requirements.  Prior to collecting data, we assessed the face validity of the measurement items by 
utilizing a panel of consulting engineers and management faculty of a large Western Canadian 
university (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998).   
 
The Contract Specificity scale measured the specificity of detail in the written contract between the 
firm and the partner, using 11 contractual items (such as product design specifications, staffing 
levels, and project scope) found in existing contract studies and practice.  The measure utilized a 
five-point Likert scale anchored at “much more detail than usual” and “much less detail than 
usual.”  The Organizational Similarity scale measured the degree of organizational similarity 
across five specific dimensions.  By reviewing extant theory (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), we 
created the following five similarity measurement items: (1) organizational goals, (2) operating 
policies, (3) management accounting and information systems, (4) corporate culture, and (5) 
national culture.  The items were measured using a five-point Likert scale anchored at “very low 
match” to “very high match.”   
 
Building on Chiles and McMackin’s (1996), exploratory interviews and executive feedback, 
Contract Monitoring Cost was measured with seven items that asked respondents about specific 
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monitoring costs, such as travel costs, communication costs, inspection costs, et cetera.  A five-
point Likert scale, anchored at “much lower than usual” and “much higher than usual,” captured 
the costs relative to other contract experiences. The Operational Flexibility scale measured the 
degree to which the respondents believed they had the necessary flexibility to operate within the 
partnership based on what they would consider to be normal, given previous experience.  The four-
item scale was adapted from Mascarenhaus' (1985) organizational flexibility scale using a five-
point Likert scale anchored at “far lower than normal” and “far greater than normal.”  Fair 
Treatment was measured using an adaptation of Greenberg's (1986) five-item interpersonal scale 
that measured determinants of perceived fairness of partner behavior.  Examples of the adaptations 
included “openness to challenges or rebuttals when judging your firm's work” and “efforts to 
solicit input and use the information when making decisions which impact upon your firm.”  The 
measure utilized a five-point Likert scale, anchored at “much lower than usual” to “much higher 
than usual.”  Finally, Partner Satisfaction measured the degree to which the firm’s expectations 
were met, coupled with the level of satisfaction with the partnering firm.  This scale was measured 
using a five-point Likert scale. 
 
Control variables:  We controlled for previous knowledge and interaction with partnering firms by 
way of three single-item scales modeled as formative indicators, creating one control index 
(Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001).  Using a five-point Likert scale, these items included 
previous level of experience with the partnering firm, previous satisfaction with the firm, and prior 
knowledge of the firm. 
 
Analysis Method & Measurement Model Results 
 
We chose to use Wold’s (1985) Partial Least Squares approach to structural equation modeling 
to estimate the measurement model and the structural paths within the structural model itself 
(Lohmöller, 1989).  Partial Least Squares differs from covariance-based models in that it utilizes 
a component-based analysis, which is more suitable for smaller sample sizes (Lohmöller, 1989), 
and is designed to minimize dependent variable variance for increased predictive ability.  The 
Partial Least Squares procedure uses an iterative estimation algorithm, based on simple or 
ordinary least squares, allowing for the creation of factor loadings and standardized beta 
regression coefficients (Chin, 1998).  As Partial Least Squares does not provide the goodness of 
fit indices common to most covariance-based methods, the stability of the beta coefficients was 
tested using the bootstrap resampling technique (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). Using the 
Partial Least Squares method (Green, Barclay & Ryans, 1995) we assessed the measurement 
model for individual item reliability, internal consistency, convergent validity, and discriminant 
validity.    
 
The measurement model was tested using standardized factor loading, t values, average variance 
extracted per construct, and composite reliability estimates Individual item reliability was found to 
exist by examining the standardized loadings of each item to its intended construct to ensure that 
at least 50% of the variance of the observed variable is shared with the construct (Green et al., 
1995).  Twenty-five of the 26 items had standardized loadings greater that .707, indicating 
individual item reliability (Carmines & Zeller 1979).  Although one item (.620 within 
organizational similarity) was slightly below the recommended .707, it was retained, as all other 
items within the construct were well above .707 (Carmines & Zeller, 1979).  Furthermore, the 
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average variance extracted of the reflective items for each of the latent variables ranged from .64 
to .74, exceeding Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) suggested .50.  Internal consistency was 
measured by determining the composite reliability of the construct measures (Fornell & Larcker 
1981).  Composite reliability, which ranged from .88 to .93, exceeded the minimum .70 
suggested by Nunnally (1978), providing evidence of internal consistency. 
 
To examine the likelihood of common method variance in the data, we performed Harman’s 
(1967) single factor test by conducting a factor analysis that included all variables.  Using an 
unrotated factor analysis, and an eigenvalue criterion of one (Hair et al., 1998), seven separate 
factors were revealed, with the first factor explaining only 10.1% of the variance in the data.  If 
common method variance was an issue, one significant factor would explain a significant portion 
of the variance in the data (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  Since this was not the case, we 
concluded that common method bias was not an issue in this analysis.  We assessed the potential 
for multicollinearity, given the number of respondents who reported on more than one 
engagement.  The maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) for the independent variables was 
1.03, well below the common cut-off threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 1998), indicating that 






The assessment of nomological validity, and the hypotheses was completed by examining the 
size and significance of the path coefficients, and the coefficient of determination (R2) value of 
the variance explained in the dependent variables.  The Partial Least Squares method provides 
estimated standardized beta coefficients for each specified path in the structural model.  To test 
the stability of the beta coefficients, the bootstrap resampling technique (Efron & Tibshirani, 
1993) was used, with resampling sizes of 250, 500 and 1,000.  The three resampling tests 
provided similar results, indicating the significance of the path coefficients.   While seven of the 
nine structural paths were found to be significant, one path (contract specificity  fair treatment) 
was significant in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized.  The structural model 
exhibited significant predictive power as 20% contract monitoring cost variance, 33% of 
operational flexibility variance, 42% of fair treatment variance and 72% of partner satisfaction 
variance was explained by the model.   
 
As shown in Table 1, support was found for six of the nine hypotheses.  Support was not found 
to indicate that (H1a) contract specificity decreased contract monitoring costs (β1a = .14 p>.10).  
Organizational similarity was found to decrease contract monitoring costs (H2a) (β2a = -.42 
p<.005), with the amount of variance explained by organizational similarity being significant (Δ 
R2 = .14, ƒ2 = .18).   As we hypothesized (H1b), contract specificity did lead to a decrease in 
operational flexibility (β1b = -.36 p<.005); while organizational similarity (H2b) increased 
operational flexibility (β2b = .39 p<.005).  Furthermore, organizational similarity explained an 
additional 13% of the explained variance of operational flexibility (R2 = .33, ƒ2 = .19).  As 
mentioned above, the path contract specificity to fair treatment was significant in the opposite 
direction of what was hypothesized (β1c = -.35 p<.005), rejecting this hypothesis.  However, as 
predicted (H2c), organizational similarity did lead to increased fair treatment (β2c = .49 p<.005).  
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The two antecedent variables explained a total of 42% of the variance in fair treatment. As 
hypothesized (H3), contract monitoring costs were found to be negatively related to partner 
satisfaction (β3 = -.20 p<.05).  While directionally accurate, operational flexibility did not 
increase partner satisfaction (H4) (β4 = .11 p<.10).  Finally, fair treatment was found to be 
positively related to partner satisfaction (β5 = .64 p<.005).  Contract specificity and 
organizational similarity were also found to have significant indirect effects on partner 
satisfaction through four of the six paths.  Contract specificity had significant negative indirect 
effects through operational flexibility (IE = -.05 p=.05) and fair treatment (IE = -.30 p=.00).  
Similarly, organizational similarity had significant positive indirect effects through operational 
flexibility (IE = .06 p=.04) and fair treatment (IE = .45 p=.00).  Overall, the model accounted for 














) CS  CMC .14 .97 (>.10) Not Supported -.04 (.21) 
H1b (-
) CS  OF -.36 3.81 (<.005) Supported -.05 (.05) 
H1c 
(+) CS  FT -.35 3.22 (<.005) Not Supported -.30 (.00) 
H2a (-
) OS  CMC -.42 4.05 (<.005) Supported .12 (.02) 
H2b 
(+) OS  OF .39 3.90 (<.005) Supported .06 (.04) 
H2c 
(+) OS  FT .49 6.74 (<.005) Supported .45 (.00) 
H3 (-) CMC  PS -.20 1.93 (<.05) Supported --- 
H4 (+) OF  PS .11 1.46 (<.10) Not Supported --- 
H5 (+) FT  PS .64 6.89 (<.005) Supported --- 
 
 
Interaction Effect and Mediation Analysis 
 
It is arguable that organizational similarity and contract specificity are not as independent of each 
other as our model posits.  Although in certain cases, similar organizations may have less 
specified contracts, it is reasonable to assume that this is not necessarily true of all 
collaborations.  To assess this assumption, we tested for interaction effects between contract 
specificity and organizational similarity on the dependent variables.  The results indicated a non-
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significant (p>.10) regression path coefficient for the interaction term.  Furthermore, the 
significance of the change in R2 for each dependent variable ranged from .137 - .829, with F 
values ranging from .076 to .900.  Thus, we concluded that there were no linear interaction 




In our research, we have drawn on exchange theory, transaction cost economics, and expectancy 
theory to develop and test a model of how partners in contractual engagements might mitigate 
the risk of engagement to increase partner satisfaction.  We empirically tested our conceptual 
model using survey data collected on 72 alliances.    We found evidence to suggest that contract 
specificity and organization similarity along with contract monitoring cost, operational flexibility 
and fair treatment are important antecedents to increasing partner satisfaction.   Broadly 
speaking, our research extends the literature by providing an empirical investigation of how 
organizations forming contractual engagements may increase partner satisfaction.   
 
Our research provides three main implications to management practice.   Firstly, where possible, 
managers of contractual engagements should seek to create partnerships with organizations with 
which they have had a previous satisfying relationship (Gulati, 1998).   Secondly, managers must 
understand that although contracts are important in the formation and operation of the 
relationship, there is likely a point where increasing written specificity has diminishing returns in 
terms of overall satisfaction with the partner.   .  Finally, managers should build in measures of 
monitor costs, operational flexibility and fair treatment between the principals 
 
This study is not without its limitations.  The use of a cross-sectional survey methodology provides 
only a synchronic examination of contractual engagements.  It is possible that outside influences 
beyond the scope of this study (temporal, psychological, physiological, et cetera) could impact the 
respondents.  Future research may consider a longitudinal study that could measure the differences 
in judgment of the constructs over time.  Furthermore, examining other industries 
(telecommunications and technology industries, for example) would allow for cross industry 
comparisons. As previously discussed, our sampling and survey administration design may have 
potentially biased executive’s responses.  Therefore, future research might consider eliminating the 
pre-survey researcher interaction and request the respondent to report on a single encounter without 















Association of Consulting Engineers of Canada, New directions for a new century: Annual 
report, Ottawa: ACEC National Office. 1999. 
Carmines, E.G., & Zeller, R.A. Reliability and validity assessment, Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications. 1979. 
Chiles, T.H. & McMackin, J.F.. Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and transaction cost 
economics. Academy of Management Review, 21, 2003, 73-100. 
Chin, W.W.  The partial least squares approach for structural equation modeling. In G.A. 
Marcoulides (Ed.), Modern Methods for Business Research, Hillside, N.J.: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1998,  295-336.. 
Consulting Engineers of Alberta, Membership Directory, Calgary, Alberta,  2002. 
Das, T.K., & Teng, B.S. Trust, control and risk in strategic alliances: an integrated framework. 
Organization Studies, 22, 2001, 251-283. 
Diamantopoulos, A., & Winklhofer, H. Index construction with formative indicators: An 
alternative to scale development. Journal of Marketing Research, 38(2), 2001, 269-277. 
Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R.J. An introduction to the bootstrap - monographs on statistics and 
applied probability, #57. New York: Chapman & Hal, 1993.. 
Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable variables 
and measurement error,  Journal of Marketing Research, 28, 1981, 39-50. 
Green, D.H., Barclay, D.W., & Ryans, A.B. Entry strategy and long-term performance: 
Conceptualization and empirical examination. Journal of Marketing, 59, 1995, 1-16. 
Greenberg, J. Determinants of perceived fairness of performance evaluation,  Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 71, 1986, 340-342.   
Hair, J.F., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L., & Black, W.C. Multivariate data analysis (5th ed.). 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 1998. 
Harman, H.H. Modern factor analysis, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 1967. 
Jemison, D.B., & Sitkin, S.B. Corporate acquisitions: a process perspective, Academy of 
Management Review, 11, 1986, 145-163.   
Joshi, A.W., & Stump R.L. The contingent effect of specific asset investment on joint action in 
manufacturer-supplier relationships: an empirical test of the moderating role of reciprocal 
asset investments, uncertainty, and trust.  Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 27, 
1999,  291-305. 
Kogut, B. A study of the life cycle of joint ventures,  In F.J. Contractor & P.  Lorange (Eds.) 
Cooperative Strategies in International Business, 205-226, 1988, Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books. 
Lambe, C.J., & Spekman, R.E., & Hunt, S.D. Interimistic relational exchange: Conceptualization 
and propositional development. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 28, 2000, 
212-225. 
Lane, P.J., & Lubatkin, M.  Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning, 
Strategic Management Journal, 19, 1998,  461-471. 
Lee, J., Chen,W., & Kao, C. Determinants and performance impact of asymmetric governance 
structures in international joint ventures: an empirical investigation.  Journal of Business 
Research, 56, 2003, 815-828. 
Lohmöller, J.B. Latent variable path modeling with partial least squares,  Heidelberg, Germany: 
Physica-Verlag, 1989.. 
 161
Lui, S.S., & Ngo, H. The role of trust and contractual safeguards on cooperation in non-equity 
alliances, Journal of Management, 30(4), 2004, 471-485. 
Macneil, I.R. The new social contract. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 1980. 
Macneil, I.R. Relational contract theory: Challenges and queries. Northwestern University Law 
Review, 94, 2000, 877-907. 
Mascarenhas, B. Flexibility: its relationship to environmental dynamism and complexity. 
International Studies of Management and Organization, XIV, 1985,  107-124.   
Nunnally, J.Parametic theory (2nd ed.), New York, N.Y: McGraw-Hill. 1978. 
Pare, K. Communications: Utilities jump into telecom driver’s seat. Electrical World, 211(9), 
1997, 36-37. 
Parkhe, A. Strategic alliance structuring: a game theoretic and transaction cost examination of 
interfirm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 1993, 794-829. 
Podsakoff, P.M., & Organ, D.W. Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and 
prospects. Journal of Management, 12, 1986, 531-544. 
Reuer, J.J., & Ariño, A. Contractual renegotiations in strategic alliances,  Journal of 
Management, 28, 2002, 47-68. 
Reve, T. & Stern, L.W. Interorganizational relations in marketing channels, Academy of 
Management Review, 4, 1979, 405-416. 
Ring, P.S., & Van de Ven,  A.H. Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational 
relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19, 1994, 90-118. 
Spekman, R.E., Isabella, L.A., MacAvoy, T.C., & Forbes, T.M. Creating strategic alliances 
which endure, Long Range Planning, 29, 1996, 346-357. 
Thibault, J.W., & Kelly, H.H. The social psychology of groups, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 1959.  
Vroom, V.H. Work and motivation, New York: John Wiley, 1964. 
Williamson, O.E. Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 36, 1993, 453-486. 
Wold, H. Systems analysis by partial least squares, In P. Nijkamp, H. Leitner & N Wrigley 
(Eds.), Measuring the Unmeasurable,  Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, 221-251.   
Zajac, E.J., & Olsen, C.P. From transaction cost to transaction value analysis: Implications for 
the study of interorganizational strategies, Journal of Management Studies, 30(1), 1993,  131-
145.  
 162
